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THE CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS
OF A CLONING SOCIETY
ELIZABETH PRICE FOLEY1

I haven't been in
It's a delight to be here today.
Birmingham for at least fifteen years, and it is as beautiful as I
remember. I want to thank the Cumberland School of Law for
hosting this important symposium on bioethics. I have been
told that it will be the first in a series of annual symposia
focused on bioethics sponsored by the Cumberland Law
Review and the Southern Center for Law and Ethics.
Recent scientific advances - most notably cloning,
made it
parthenogenesis, and stem cell research-have
imperative that we, as lawyers, give serious thought not just to
the ethical implications of these scientific advances, but also to
the legal implications. That's what I want to talk to you about
today: the significant legal - particularly constitutionalimplications of human cloning. I'll be focusing specifically on
reproductive cloning as opposed to therapeutic cloning - that
is, the use of cloning technology to produce a baby.
Although previous speakers did a good job of laying out
the basic science involved in nuclear transfer cloning, I'd like to
go over the science briefly again because I think it's imperative
that we understand the science in order to understand the
implications of this technology. The process that created Dolly
the sheep is commonly referred to as nuclear transfer cloning,
or "NT." There is another, older type of cloning that has been
around for years, called embryo splitting. Embryo splitting is
just what it sounds like: the splitting of the cells in a developing
embryo to create multiple embryos with the same genetic
composition. In order to clone by embryo splitting, you
literally take the developing cells in an embryo and split them
apart. The cells that are split apart then continue dividing,
with the result that identical twins, triplets, or other multiples
are ultimately born. Cloning by embryo splitting has been
successfully performed since the 1950s, with the earliest
experiments being done on frogs. And cloning human beings
was accomplished using embryo splitting back in 1993 by
1 Professor of Law, Michigan State University, Detroit College of Law. LL.M.,
Harvard Law School, J.D., summa cure laude, University of Tennessee; B.A.,
Emory University.
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scientists at George Washington University.
The reason that cloning using embryo splitting was not as
big a news item as the NT cloning that created Dolly is that,
when you create a clone by embryo splitting, you don't know
what you're "getting," so to speak. That's because the embryo
being split is an embryo created by the unification of sperm
and egg- a new life that is the unique combination of the
genes of the mother and father. Because this embryo has not
yet been born and raised, it is an unknown entity. You don't
know if the embryo being split will turn out to be smart or dull,
tall or short, healthy or sickly. So if you wanted to use embryo
splitting cloning to create several cows, you'd have no idea
whether the cow you cloned would turn out to be a cow you'd
want to have more than one of.
Cloning by nuclear transfer, on the other hand, allows you
to clone a known entity. By definition, when you use nuclear
transfer technology, you are using a cell from an adult to
reproduce the adult. Specifically, you would first take a donor
egg and remove its nucleus. This is the process known as
enucleation. You literally take the donor egg and suck the
nucleus out using a pipette. Then you would take a cell from
an adult (in the case of Dolly, it was a mammary cell from an
adult female ewe -hence, the name Dolly) and inject this adult
cell back into the enucleated egg. This is the process known as
re-nucleation.
Once the egg has been re-nucleated with the adult donor's
cell, a process known as fusion must occur. Literally, this
means that the egg and the donor cell have to be fused
together, using a stream of electricity generated by a fusion
chamber. The electricity from the fusion chamber provides the
spark of life; once the egg and adult donor cell have been fused
together, the donor cell in the egg begins dividing, as though it
had been fertilized with sperm. Once the developing embryo
has divided into the blastocyst stage (a hollow ball of
approximately 100 cells), the embryo is ready to be implanted
into a womb, or surrogate mom.
Dolly the sheep was created this way. She's about five and
a half years old now and appears to be quite healthy and
normal. She has a touch of arthritis, but this is not unusual for
a sheep her age. She has even given birth to her own lambs about six of them, I believe, all of which are also very normal.
There has been a report that Dolly's telomeres are slightly
shorter than they should be for a sheep her age. Telomeres,
you may recall, are located on the ends of our chromosomes.
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They are believed to provide a rough indication of age. The
longer the telomeres, the younger the animal (or person). The
shorter the telomeres, the older. So Dolly's telomeres are
slightly shorter than you would expect, but not significantly so.
And there's no indication that her shortened telomeres are an
inevitable part of the result of the cloning process. The cattle
that have been cloned using NT, for example, appear to have
longer than expected telomeres. So the premature aging
thesis -that offspring of NT cloning will inherit the same age
as that of the adult cell donor - does not appear to pan out.
One thing to keep in mind here is that, with the NT
transfer process (or embryo splitting, for that matter), there are
no instant adults. The process is merely another way to create
a baby, who must then be carried to term by a female, nurtured
and raised, just like any other baby. The key difference, of
course, is that, with NT cloning, the male of the species is no
longer a necessary component in reproduction. I can see the
men in the audience starting to squirm. Just think how we
women would feel if someone told us that there was a new
way to reproduce that did not require women! I think we'd be
a little nervous and insecure, too. And theoretically, that day
may ultimately come. There is currently research underway to
develop artificial wombs, where you would literally grow the
baby in a giant plexi-glass tube, just like the science fiction
movies. But that technology is in its incipiency, and is a very
long way off. For now, any known type of reproduction
(including cloning) requires a female womb in which to gestate
the baby.
NT cloning has been successfully accomplished with
several species: goats, mice, pigs, cattle, and most recently, cats.
The cattle cloning business has proved particularly successful.
You can see the picture there of a cow with the caption that
reads, "Once a Dream. Now a Reality. We can now clone your
cattle." This is from the Advanced Cell Technology web page.
Their subsidiary, Cyagra, will clone a cow for $20,000, and
$5,000 for each additional healthy clone you want produced.
You can go to their web page and see pictures of many
different kinds of cows they have cloned. They have even used
NT cloning to reproduce a female longhorn who has the
longest horns ever known to exist on a female longhorn. The
baby is due sometime soon. The cat that was cloned recently I think it was born in November 2001, although the
announcement wasn't made public until just a few weeks ago,
in February 2002-is named "Cc," for carbon copy, or copycat.
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It is a female calico, just like the female calico that donated the
adult cell.
The hope is that, one day soon, NT transfer cloning will be
available to reproduce a beloved dead pet. Of course, the new
pet would not really be an exact genetic duplicate of the dead
pet. It would inherit mitochondrial DNA from the female who
donated the originally enucleated egg. But, for the most part, it
would be a genetic duplicate, just not one hundred percent.
And, of course, it would grow up in a very different time and
have different life experiences. So its environment would
likely produce a pet with a different personality. After all, if
you cloned yourself, the resulting child would look a great deal
like you, but would not share your life experiences and may
not end up sharing your interests or talents. Its life experiences
would even alter its appearance from yours: it would likely
have a different hair style or color, and it may have more or
fewer wrinkles than you. Just take a close look at some of your
friends who are identical twins. They share the same exact
DNA (even their mitochondrial DNA is the same, which will
not be true for cloning), yet there are subtle differences in facial
features and the like.
And by the way, the rhesus monkey that you may have
heard media reports about was not cloned using NT. It was
cloned using the embryo splitting technique I talked about
earlier. So there have not yet been any successful cloning
attempts on higher primates.
NT transfer technology holds great promise, not just for
helping infertile couples have a biologically related child or
reproducing a near-copy of a beloved dead pet, but also for
possibly reviving endangered species or even bringing back
extinct ones. In January 2001, ACT successfully cloned a guar
which, as you can see, is an ox-like creature. It's endangered
and there are only 36,000 of them remaining. The remarkable
thing about the cloning of the guar was that they used what's
known as "inter-species" NT cloning. This is where you take
an egg from one species, enucleate it, and renucleate it with an
adult donor cell from another species. So with the guar, they
enucleated an egg from an ordinary cow, renucleated it with
the cell from an adult guar, fused the two together, and
implanted the resulting embryo in the womb of a surrogate
cow mom. The pregnant cow carried the guar to term. The
baby guar, Noah, was born after a normal gestational period
and appears to be normal in all respects.
ACT also has plans to use inter-species cloning to clone a
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cheetah, using the enucleated egg of another species of large
cat. There are also talks underway to use inter-species NT
cloning to clone the endangered giant panda. Chinese
scientists have already announced that they have successfully
fused muscle, uterus and mammary cells from adult pandas
with enucleated eggs from rabbits. But, needless to say, the
rabbit is too small to serve as the surrogate mom. So the likely
egg donor and surrogate mom will be another species of bear,
most likely the American black bear.
When it comes to using inter-species NT to bring back
extinct species, such as the dinosaur or woolly mammoth, there
is a larger problem. First of all, there is not very much
preserved tissue or cells from these extinct animals with which
to work. And when tissue does exist, the DNA from the tissue
is always damaged. It has big genetic gaps in it that are, at
present, impossible to fill. You may have heard about the wellpreserved woolly mammoth that was found a couple of years
ago in the Arctic. Even though it was remarkably wellpreserved (given its age), the DNA has proven to be full of
holes. So it could not be used to bring the woolly mammoth
back to life. Same thing goes with the Tasmanian tiger that you
see there. It became extinct in the 1930s, but there is a pup that
has been preserved in alcohol since 1866. But again, the DNA
is so badly damaged that successful NT cloning is unlikely.
You can also see there a picture of the last remaining
burcado, which is a type of mountain goat native to Spain. It's
a female, and this picture was taken of her in 1999. Shortly
after the picture was taken, a tree fell on her and she died.
Now there are no more burcados on earth. Fortunately, the
scientists back in 1999 preserved some of her cells and ACT
now has plans underway to use inter-species NT cloning to
bring the burcado back. They'll likely use another species of
goat to serve as the egg donor and surrogate mom. Of course,
without cells from a male burcado, they can never bring male
burcados back to life.
Of course the six million-dollar question still remains: can
NT transfer cloning be successfully used on humans? The
answer is clearly "yes." In fact, it's already been done. In
November 2001, ACT published a paper in which it announced
that it had used NT to create three human embryos.
Specifically, they re-nucleated and fused nineteen human
donor eggs. Eleven of the nineteen were re-nucleated with skin
cells scraped from human donors. The other eight were renucleated with cumulus cells from human donors. Of the

CUMBERLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32:503

nineteen eggs re-nucleated with skin cells, none began dividing
after fusion. But of the eight eggs re-nucleated with cumulus
cells, three began dividing after fusion, creating human
embryos. One survived to the two-cell stage, one survived to
the four-cell stage, and one survived to the six-cell stage before
dying naturally. Critics of the ACT experiments say that the
experiments are insignificant because none of the human
embryos survived to the blastocyst stage. As you recall, it's
only when an embryo reaches the blastocyst stage that it is
ready to be implanted into a womb. So since none of the three
embryos in the ACT experiment survived to the blastocyst
stage, some think that this shows that human NT cloning
cannot be accomplished. I think it's only a matter of time
before the critics are proven wrong about this.
Assuming that NT cloning will eventually be successfully
used on humans, we need to be prepared to discuss the legal
consequences, including the constitutional consequences. As
an initial matter, we need to consider whether children
conceived by cloning would be considered "human." They are
conceived by a new, unusual means of reproduction. But
should this make a difference in how we characterize them?
Would we consider them somehow subhuman because they
were conceived using NT cloning? I don't think we would, or
should.
Although there was a tremendous amount of
opposition to IVF in the late 70s when the first "test tube baby,"
Louise Brown, was born, no one seriously doubted that Louise
Brown (or those that followed her) was fully human. Likewise,
we don't say that babies conceived by other assisted
reproductive technologies such as artificial insemination, GIFT,
or ZIFT, are less than human. If your parents used a weird
sexual position to conceive you, we don't hold that against
you-you're still fully human, without regard to what we think
about the manner of your conception. So we haven't, as a
society, seen fit to start making distinctions, or categories, of
humans, based on the manner of their conception. This is a
good thing. And I think it clearly suggests that children
conceived by cloning would be fully human. Even the most
vehement critics of NT cloning on humans concede that babies
conceived by cloning would be human. They just feel sorry for
them and argue that they should never be born.
But if you accept that individuals created by cloning are
"human," a number of legal consequences automatically
follow. The most common science fiction scenarios could not
occur under the current legal framework. For example, a child
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created by cloning could not serve as a source of spare organs
for another. Current statutes prohibiting battery and murder
would apply. If you yanked someone's kidney out without his
or her consent, it's a battery. If you yanked their heart out, it'd
be murder. Even if you passed a law saying that the battery
and murder statutes did not apply when you removed organs
from people conceived by cloning, such a statute would surely
be invalidated on due process grounds. You may recall the
famous Supreme Court case of Rochin v. California,2 decided in
1952, where the Court held that due process is offended by the
removal of items from the body if such removal "shocks the
conscience." 3 Specifically, the Rochin Court found that it
shocked the conscience to permit the pumping of the stomach4
of an individual suspected of swallowing morphine capsules.
I would suggest to you that if pumping someone's stomach
shocks the conscience, removing their kidney or heart would,
too.
Another legal issue that has been raised is the Thirteenth
Amendment. Some have suggested that cloning itself enslaves
those who are conceived that way. They argue that Congress
should be able to use its power under the Thirteenth
Amendment's Enabling Clause to ban human cloning to
prevent this kind of human enslavement. First of all, the idea
that a person conceived by cloning lacks free will or personal
autonomy because they share DNA with the person who
donated the adult cell for NT is genetic reductionism at its
worst. It just gives far too much weight to the role of genetics
in personality and individuality. It also fails to acknowledge
that twins or other multiples are unique individuals, despite
their shared genome.
The Thirteenth Amendment doesn't just prohibit
involuntary servitude in a self-executing way; it also has an
Enabling Clause that allows Congress to pass laws to eliminate
the "badges and incidents" of slavery.5 This term, "badges and
incidents," has been interpreted by the courts to mean that
Congress may pass laws aimed at removing a stamp of
inferiority based on race. 6 Would a law banning human
cloning be a law that removes a stamp of inferiority based on
race? It's unlikely. First of all, individuals conceived by
2 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
3 Id. at 172.
4 Id.
5 See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409,439-40 (1968).

6 Id. at 443, n.78; see also id. at 445-48 (Douglas, J., concurring).
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cloning would not constitute a separate "race," as that term is
currently understood. They would not be a distinct ethnic
group bound by a common history, nationality, or geographic
distribution. Each person conceived by cloning would be born
in a different time, in a different place, and in a different
family with unique traditions. Moreover, a ban on human
cloning would not likely be based upon a desire to eliminate a
stamp of inferiority. More likely, a ban would be based on the
perceived social and ethical implications of cloning, not out of
any fear that individuals conceived by cloning would be
inferior.
If anything, the common perception is that
individuals conceived by cloning would be somehow superior,
not inferior - that cloning would be used eugenically to
perpetuate superior genomes. Besides, it makes little sense to
suggest that Congress could, through banning human cloning,
eliminate some perceived stamp of inferiority.
That's
tantamount to saying that you can eliminate a perceived stamp
of inferiority by prohibiting individuals from being born at all.
Surely we wouldn't allow Congress, for example, to pass a law
(pursuant to the Enabling Clause) that would have banned
reproduction by freed slaves, on the rationale that doing so
prevents those unborn children from suffering through a life
with a stamp of inferiority?
The First Amendment would likewise be implicated in any
attempted ban on human cloning.
It is undoubtedly
permissible for Congress to ban certain types of research
funded with federal dollars. Congress has done this kind of
thing before with fetal tissue and stem cell research. The
constitutional spending power permits this sort of ban on the
use of federal dollars. But it's a whole different matter for
Congress to try to ban research using private dollars because
it's no longer a matter of exercising the spending power, but a
matter of deciding whether the law enacted violates the First
Amendment.
The Supreme Court said, in the famous obscenity case,
Miller v. California,7 that the First Amendment protects those
communications with "serious literary, artistic, or scientific
value."8
Does anyone doubt that writings or thoughts
regarding human cloning have serious scientific value? I don't
think so. But, of course, Congress wouldn't pass a law just
banning writings or thought on human cloning. It would ban

7 413

U.S. 24 (1973).

8 Id. at 24.
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action-i.e., actual attempts to engage in human cloning. And
the First Amendment doesn't just protect against thought
police; it protects expressive action, such as burning of a flag or
a draft card, or wearing armbands in protest of the war. So the
question becomes whether attempts at human cloning would
be expressive action. And the key to this question is whether
the action is intended to be communicative by the speaker. So
we'd have to decide whether the scientist who attempted
human cloning would be intending to communicate
something.
I think it clear that, by attempting human cloning, a
scientist would be engaging in expressive conduct. When it
comes to science, a scientist doesn't just want to think or write
about a hypothesis, she wants to test it, to engage in
experimentation to see if the idea works. A scientist who
attempted human cloning would clearly be trying to
communicate to the world that human cloning was not only
possible, but also normatively desirable, at least in certain
This communicative element is inherent in
instances.
The scientist testing her
experimentation of any kind.
hypothesis is no different from the painter who expresses
himself not by thinking about painting, but by actually
painting it, or the singer who expresses himself not by thinking
of the tune, but by singing it. They are all expressing their
creative abilities in meaningful ways that are understood by
the audience that views their actions. You shouldn't be able to
ban scientific experimentation (absent a compelling
governmental interest and narrow tailoring) any more than
you could ban the painting of a picture or the singing of a song.
Beyond the First and Thirteenth Amendments, however, is
a more intriguing question: whether the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments would prohibit Congress
from banning human cloning. Specifically, would cloning be
considered to be within the ambit of the right to reproduce?
This right clearly exists, not only in a negative sense (i.e., the
right not to have children by using contraceptives or having a
pre-viability abortion), but also in a positive sense (i.e., the
right to have biologically related children of one's own). In
1942, the Supreme Court, in a case called Skinner v. Oklahoma,9
invalidated an Oklahoma statute that mandated sterilization
for felons convicted of repeated crimes of moral turpitude. The
Court invoked strict scrutiny to invalidate the law on equal
9 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
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protection grounds, stating that the law violated "one of the
basic civil rights of man" and that "marriage and procreation
are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the
human race." 10 More recently, the Court in Planned Parenthood
of Southeastern Pennsylvaniav. Casey1 stated:
Our law affords constitutional protection to decisions relating
to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships,
child rearing, and education.... These matters, involving the
most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a
lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are
central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.
At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept
of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of
human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the
attributes of12personhood were they formed under compulsion
of the state.

So it seems quite clear that individuals have a right, under
the Due Process Clause, to bear and beget offspring, at least via

old-fashioned sexual intercourse. But what about reproduction
by non-coital means? In other words, does the right to
reproduce include the right to use assisted reproductive
technologies to have a child? This is not an easy question to
answer because the government (whether state or federal) has
rarely acted to prevent reproduction, much less reproduction
by assisted reproductive technologies. Even though there was
fierce theological and ethical objections voiced to the use of
artificial insemination and in vitro fertilization (IVF) in the
beginning, there were no laws passed to ban reproduction
using these technologies. So there is not a lot of case law that
can help answer this question. But the limited case law that
does exist uniformly holds that the use of assisted reproductive
technologies are included within the ambit of the right to

reproduce.
There are several cases I'd like to bring to your attention.
The first is the famous "Baby M" case decided by the New
Jersey Supreme Court back in 1988.13 You may recall that, in
this case, William Stern and Mary Beth Whitehead entered into
a surrogacy contract whereby Whitehead agreed to be
artificially inseminated with the sperm of Stern. Whitehead
agreed to carry the baby to term and relinquish the baby after
birth to Stern and his wife. After Baby M was born, Whitehead
10 Id. at 541.

u 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
12 Id. at 851.
13 537A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
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refused to turn the baby over. Stern then filed suit seeking
custody of the baby. Stern's argument was that, as the
biological father of the child, his right to reproduce was being
infringed by being denied custody of his own child. The New
Jersey Supreme Court agreed that Stem had a constitutional
right to reproduce and that this right included the right to use
artificial insemination. 14 The court went on to conclude that
Stem's right to reproduce had not been infringed because Baby
M had already been born.' 5 The right to reproduce did not
include the right to custody of the child. 16 They were two
different rights. But clearly the court agreed that an individual
has a right to use artificial insemination to create a biologically
related child.
Another important case is Lifchez v. Hartigan,17 decided by
the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois in 1990.
In this case a physician brought a class action on behalf of all
physicians specializing in reproductive endocrinology and
fertility counseling.
He sought to have a state statute
prohibiting
experimentation
on
fetuses
declared
unconstitutional on grounds that it was vague and violated a
woman's right to reproductive privacy. The physician was
specifically worried about whether the statute in question
would criminalize certain aspects of IVF, such as genetic
screening of the embryos, the hormonal induction of ovulation,
and embryo transfer. The district court agreed with the
physician and invalidated the statute, stating that "[it takes no
great leap of logic to see that within the cluster of
constitutionally protected choices that includes the right to
have access to contraceptives, there must be included within
that cluster the right to submit to a medical procedure
that may
bring about, rather than prevent, pregnancy." 18
More recently, the Ninth Circuit decided a remarkable
case. The panel has granted a petition for rehearing in the case,
so we don't yet know what the court will ultimately hold, but

14 Id. at 1253 ("The right to procreate very simply is the right to have natural
children, whether through sexual intercourse or artificial insemination.").
15 Id. at 1253.
16Id. at 1254 ("There is nothing in our culture or society that even begins to
suggest a fundamental right on the part of the father to the custody of the child

as part of his right to procreate when opposed by the claim of the mother to the
same child.").
17 735 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Ill.), affd without opinion, sub nom., Scholberg v.
Lifchez, 914 F.2d 260 (7th Cir. 1990).
18Id. at 1377.
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the original decision is fascinating. In Gerber v. Hickman,1 9 a
state prisoner brought a Section 1983 claim against the prison,
alleging that his right to reproduce was violated by the prison's
refusal to allow him to mail a semen specimen to a laboratory
for use in artificially inseminating his wife. The original Ninth
Circuit panel ruled that the district court erred in granting a
12(b)(6) dismissal of the prisoner's claim because, if the
prisoner's allegations were taken as true, they did state a
cognizable claim of constitutional deprivation. So clearly the
rationale of this decision supports the idea that, within the
ambit of the right to reproduce, an individual-even a
prisoner-has the right to use assisted reproductive
technologies such as artificial insemination.
All of these cases, of course, deal with whether one has a
constitutional right to use sexual assisted reproductive
technologies -i.e., those technologies that create a baby in a
non-coital way, but still requiring the unification of sperm and
egg. Cloning, of course, is not a sexual means of reproducing;
it is asexual. It does not require the unification of sperm and
egg. It does require the use of an egg, but it does not require
the use of sperm. But cloning is not the only type of asexual
Parthenogenesis, or "virgin birth," is also
reproduction.
asexual. The egg begins spontaneously dividing as if fertilized
by a sperm. Parthenogenesis occurs naturally in several
species, including drone bees, poultry, mice, golden hamsters,
and marine invertebrates. There have been no documented
cases of parthenogenesis in human beings, but some scientists
speculate that it could, in theory, account for one out of every
one to two million human births.
Non-natural (or induced) parthenogenesis is also possible.
In other words, it is possible to stimulate an egg with a
combination of chemicals to coax it into dividing as though it
had been fertilized. This is not just science fiction; it is now
reality. In late November 2001, ACT reported that it had
successfully induced parthenogenesis in human eggs
stimulated by chemicals. Specifically, twenty-two human eggs
were taken from donors. The eggs were soaked in a chemical
solution. After five days, six out of the twenty-two (thirty
percent) had divided to the point of forming blastomeres. They
were then destroyed. So parthenogenesis is clearly possible for
humans and presents the same kinds of issues raised by NT
cloning.
19 264 F.3d 882 (9th Cir. 2001), reh'g granted,2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 25920 (9th Cir.
Dec. 4, 2001).
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If the constitutional right to reproduce includes the right to
use assisted reproductive technologies such as artificial
insemination and IVF, I don't see any strong logical reason
why it should not also include the right to use asexual assisted
reproductive
technologies
such
as
cloning
and
parthenogenesis. The right to reproduce does not protect a
particular means of reproduction, it protects the ends - the
right to bear or beget a biologically related child. Once we
move beyond sexual intercourse as the means of procreation,
all non-coital means (whether sexual or asexual) are essentially
the same: an egg is somehow stimulated to begin the process of
cell division. With sexual non-coital means, the stimulation is,
of course, achieved with a sperm. With asexual non-coital
means, however, the stimulation is achieved without a sperm,
by the use of electricity (as with NT cloning) or chemical
stimulation (as with parthenogenesis). I don't see any evidence
or logic that would support the proposition that the right to
reproduce includes only the right to reproduce using a sperm.
Although most people would clearly prefer to reproduce the
old-fashioned way (i.e., intercourse), this is not possible for
many couples who wish to have a biologically related child.
And for those who cannot reproduce by intercourse, no doubt
the vast majority would prefer to use an assisted reproductive
technology that uses both a sperm and an egg, if possible. But
there are still countless thousands for whom the use of sperm
and egg will not be possible and who still desire to have a
biologically related child. For these individuals, NT cloning
and parthenogenesis offer real hope.
If the right to reproduce includes the right to use sexual
and asexual assisted reproductive technologies to have a child,
the final question we must ask ourselves, from a legal
standpoint, is whether the government has sufficiently
compelling interests to prevent individuals from reproducing
this way. The opponents of NT cloning, for example, have
stated that it should be banned because it poses risks to the
traditional marriage and family structures and demeans
personal autonomy or individuality. Opponents also argue that
a ban is necessary to protect the health and safety of the unborn
and to protect genetic diversity. The first two objections to NT
cloning-protecting marriage/family and denial of personal
autonomy-can be quickly dismissed because they are, quite
simply, based upon nothing more than mere speculation.
There is absolutely no evidence that allowing NT transfer for
reproductive purposes would undermine marriage or families.
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To the extent that these institutions are perceived as being
vulnerable today, I would suggest that this vulnerability is due
to many, many factors, and that the availability of NT cloning
would have little additional negative effect, if any. With regard
to the autonomy/individuality argument, again, this is based
on personal perception and speculation, not any objective
information. And, as I stated before, it is genetic reductionism
at its worst.
The objections relating to NT cloning's impact on genetic
diversity can also be quickly dismissed, although at least this
objection is based in something other than subjective moral
beliefs about family, marriage, or individuality. The fear here
is that, if NT cloning (and presumably parthenogenesis)
becomes available, the human race will become, over time, less
genetically diverse, and we'd be vulnerable to black plagues
and the like. If we all have closely related genetic structures,
one bad bug to which we're all susceptible could wipe us out.
This may indeed be a realistic fear with regard to genetically
engineered crops or livestock. But there is no evidence that, if
NT cloning became available, that it would become the
preferred method of reproduction. For every yuppie that
decided he/she wanted to clone him/herself, there would be
literally millions of couples who would prefer to reproduce the
old-fashioned way. The likely cost of NT cloning will clearly
be an impediment to most people. But beyond cost, NT
cloning is likely to be attractive mostly to those individuals
who cannot have a biologically related child in any other way.
This is clearly not a risk to our genetic diversity, any more than
are twins or other multiples.
The final asserted governmental interest in banning NT
cloning is that a ban is needed to protect the health and safety
of the unborn. Specifically, opponents of cloning point to the
Dolly experiments to support their argument that NT cloning is
simply too risky to permit its use on human embryos. These
people will tell you that only one out of 277 of the lamb
The
embryos created in the Dolly experiments lived.
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began the process of cell division. This means that only
twenty-nine lamb embryos were created in the first place. And
of these twenty-nine lamb embryos created, they were
implanted into thirteen surrogate mom ewes. Of the thirteen
pregnancies attempted, only one baby lamb was born (Dolly).
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So the more correct figure is that one out of thirteen attempted
pregnancies resulted in a live birth. And one out of thirteen is
not that bad. It's not that much different, for example, from the
success rate associated with IVF.
There has also been some talk that NT cloning poses a risk
of unusually large offspring. The specter here is that big,
malformed human babies would be born if we allowed NT
cloning to occur with humans. There has been some evidence
of this phenomenon in the cattle that have been cloned. But it
has not happened in other species. It is now believed that the
large offspring is due to a gene unique to cattle, so it could not
happen in other species. And the problem appears to be linked
to the manner in which the NT was accomplished. NT is a
delicate procedure that requires a delicate touch. But with the
right procedures and genetic screening this problem should be
avoidable in cattle and should not exist at all with other
species.
The talk about so-called waste embryos that would be
created and either discarded or miscarried during attempts at
NT cloning in humans is likewise misleading. First of all, it's
important to realize that no manner of reproduction is foolproof. About forty percent of the times that a human embryo is
created by sexual intercourse, the embryo is spontaneously
aborted. Most of the time, the embryo never even implants
into the womb, usually due to a genetic defect in the embryo.
It's nature's way of helping to ensure that only the strong
survive. And, of course, there are always the times when a
human baby conceived by sexual intercourse has a serious
disease, condition, or deformity.
Let's face it there are
tremendous risks inherent in procreating by sexual intercourse.
It's not an error-free enterprise.
And we've already accepted, as a society, that there will be
even larger failure rates associated with assisted reproductive
technologies which are, by their nature, a higher risk
enterprise. The "take home baby rate" of WVF, for example, is
only about 10-30 percent, depending on which clinic and which
physician is doing the procedure. In the vast majority of IVF
attempts, the embryo created in the petri dish fails to thrive
and is either absorbed or spontaneously aborted. Moreover,
there are literally thousands of human embryos created by IVF
that are discarded or frozen indefinitely. The problem got so
bad in England that in 1990, the British Parliament passed a
law mandating the destruction of some 3,000 frozen embryos
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created by IVF.20 So the problem of waste embryos is not a new
problem posed by NT cloning. If we can accept that existing
assisted reproductive technologies inevitably present a high
likelihood of miscarriage, spontaneous abortion or stillbirth,
can we fairly characterize this problem as providing the
"compelling government interest" sufficient to justify a total
ban on reproductive NT cloning? I don't think so.
Even if you do not agree with me on this, there is still
another constitutional hurdle that must be overcome by those
who would impose a total ban on human NT cloning.
Specifically, even if the health/safety issue is accepted as a
sufficiently compelling governmental interest, a ban on human
cloning must also be narrowly tailored to further that interest.
I would suggest that a total ban on reproductive NT cloning is
not narrowly tailored. If health/safety is the compelling
interest that motivates us to ban human reproductive cloning,
are there not more narrowly tailored means that could further
this interest? Couldn't Congress, for example, pass a law that
would impose standards on the personnel and procedures
employed in NT cloning? It could specify how the procedure
would be done and by whom. In this way, it could ensure that
the procedure, while not risk-free, was as safe as it could be.
And the women who agreed to serve as egg donors and
surrogate moms would, presumably, be provided with the
requisite informed consent (just like they are for any other risky
medical procedure).
In this manner, Congress could
accommodate those who fear that the procedure is too risky,
yet also accommodate those who are willing to take the risk in
return for the chance of having a child of their own.
The bottom line, it seems to me, is that NT cloning (and
parthenogenesis) is just another way to have a baby. It may be
novel, it may present some risks, but these risks are inherent in
all kinds of reproduction and the payoff, for those wanting a
child, is potentially very big. The right to reproduce should not
be limited by the manner of reproduction chosen. If the goal is
to have, love, and raise a child of one's own, the means chosen
to achieve that goal should not matter. If the much uttered
phrase, "family values," means anything, shouldn't it mean
this?
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